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Abstract 
 
In this study, we investigate the financial and monetary policy responses to oil price shocks using 
a Structural VAR framework. We distinguish between net oil-importing and net oil-exporting 
countries. Since the 80s, a significant number of empirical studies have been published 
investigating the effect of oil prices on macroeconomic and financial variables. Most of these 
studies though, do not make a distinction between oil-importing and oil-exporting economies. 
Overall, our results indicate that the level of inflation in both net oil-exporting and net oil-
importing countries is significantly affected by oil price innovations. Furthermore, we find that 
the response of interest rates to an oil price shock depends heavily on the monetary policy regime 
of each country. Finally, stock markets operating in net oil-importing countries exhibit a negative 
response to increased oil prices. The reverse is true for the stock market of the net oil-exporting 
countries. We find evidence that the magnitude of stock market responses to oil price shocks is 
higher for the newly established and/or less liquid stock markets. 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to examine the financial and monetary policy responses to oil price 
shocks for eight European countries; namely, the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Norway. We also consider Russia, as it constitutes a key energy 
supplier of Europe. In particular, both the level of inflation and interest rates will be used as 
proxies of the monetary policy response to oil price shocks, while stock market returns will serve 
as a measure of the financial response to these shocks. We distinguish between net oil-importing 
and net oil-exporting countries.  
It is worth noting that very little work has been done with respect to monetary policy and oil 
prices for Russia, while at the same time most papers usually examine the effect of oil price 
shocks on the macroeconomic aggregates and not on monetary policy. 
The selection of countries satisfies three main concerns of the authors. Primarily this study is 
related to European continent countries, which have not been extensively studied in the past. In 
addition, given that the sample consists of two net oil-exporting countries (Norway and Russia) 
and seven net oil-importing countries (UK1, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands and 
Portugal), it allows for a thorough comparison of their financial and monetary responses to oil 
price shocks. Relatively little research has been conducted on the different effects of an oil price 
shock on the two aforementioned groups of countries (see, inter alia, Korhonen and Ledyaeva, 
2010; Bjornland, 2009; Lescaroux and Mignon, 2008; Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2005). 
Finally, there is a special focus of this study on possible diverse oil price effects between the 
traditional stock markets, such as UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Netherlands and the 
newly established and/or less liquid stock markets, such as Russia, Norway and Portugal. Thus 
                                                 
1 UK is classified as a net oil importer based on its current status. We need to consider though, that for most part of 
the sample period the country was a net oil-exporter. This draws a distinction between UK and the remaining six net 
oil-importing countries of the sample. We further consider this distinction in the analysis of the empirical findings.  
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motivated, our study elucidates three important aspects, which have not been extensively 
examined in the past. 
The extensive literature has so far addressed several issues related to the impact of oil price 
innovations in member-countries of the G7, OPEC and OECD (see, inter alia, Miller and Ratti, 
2009; Cologni and Manera, 2008; Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2005). Prominent among 
these issues is the investigation of the effects of an oil price shock on various macroeconomic 
variables, such as GDP, consumer price index, interest rates, industrial production and 
unemployment.  
Furthermore, authors such as Sadorsky (1999), Jones and Kaul (1996) and Haung, Masulis and 
Stoll (1996) investigate the relationship between oil prices and stock market returns. They all 
conclude that oil price changes are important determinants of stock market returns. Economic 
theory documents that any asset price is determined by the expected discounted cash flows of that 
asset. Therefore, an oil price increase would inflate costs and profits would eventually decrease, 
undermining shareholders value. In this regard, stock prices will tend to decrease. However, the 
aforementioned studies do not examine whether the relationship between oil prices and stock 
market performance is different for oil-importing and oil-exporting countries. This paper fills this 
void. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly discuss the theory 
underpinning the transmission mechanisms among oil, inflation, interest rates, and the stock 
market. We then turn our focus to the existing work in the field under consideration, 
documenting the relationship between oil prices, the economy and stock markets. A brief 
description of the Structural VAR model, as well as, the presentation of our dataset, follows. 
Finally, empirical results are outlined and discussed, before a conclusion is reached. 
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2. Theoretical context of transmission mechanisms 
Figure 1 portrays a simple AD/AS framework adopted by Elwood (2001) of the effects of oil 
price shocks on a net oil-exporting country. The effects of an oil price increase are expected to be 
positive, as initially, the income of this country is likely to increase, shifting the AS1 curve 
towards the right (AS2) – this is displayed as the income effect. It is reasonable to expect that the 
increase in oil prices will increase production costs in the oil exporting country (production cost 
effect); however, the magnitude of the income effect can reverse the negative impact of oil on 
production costs, thus leading to an overall increase in aggregate supply (Q2). In addition, we 
anticipate the AD1 curve to shift rightwards to AD2, as the value of export demand for oil rises. 
Consequently, both consumption and investment are expected to rise in magnitude and this, in 
turn, will lead to an increase in employment. Stock markets are expected to rise as a result of a 
prosperous environment. This period of growth is likely to come to an end though, as demand-
side inflation will eventually make its appearance (price levels will rise from P1 to P2). 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Figure 2 describes the effects of an oil price shock on a net oil-importing country. As depicted on 
the AD/AS model, a net oil-importing country immediately faces increased production costs 
(production cost effect), considering that oil, in its various forms, constitutes one of the most 
basic inputs of production. The oil price increase will have a negative impact on the country’s 
welfare, causing a reduction in the quantity supplied (income effect). Overall, it is observed that 
both the income and production cost effects will move the AS1 curve leftwards to AS2, with the 
output equal Q2. Furthermore, increased production costs will be passed on to consumers (see, for 
example, Abel and Bernanke, 2001; Hamilton, 1996; Hamilton, 1988; Barro, 1984, among other), 
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resulting in relatively low levels of aggregate demand (AD1 curve will shift to the left to AD2) 
and higher prices (cost-push inflation – price levels move from P1 to P2). 
  
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
Subsequently, unemployment is expected to rise, as a result of the reduction in consumption and 
output levels. Stock markets are expected to decline as a result of a negative environment. In 
short, this country may very well enter a period of economic downturn.  
Eventually it all comes down to monetary policy to keep the economy on an even keel (Bernane, 
Gertler and Watson, 1997). Based on the ISLM framework, an increase in the short term interest 
rates (i.e. contractionary monetary policy) might be a suitable treatment for the demand-side 
inflation in a net oil-exporting country. The transmission channel of such monetary policy, in the 
case of increased inflation, can be shown schematically, as follows: 
MirIY 
where M indicates money supply, a decline of which will lead to an increase in the level of 
interest rates (ir) which in turn exercise a negative effect on investment (I) and output (Y). Thus, 
if the central bank decides to raise the short term interest rates, the expected confinement of 
investment and output will eventually restrain inflation. This rise of interest rates though, will 
negatively affect stock market performance.  
On the other hand, a decrease in the interest rates will probably be a suitable decision for the net 
oil-importing country, providing demand stimulus. Schematically, this is shown below: 
MirIY 
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More specifically, we anticipate that the period of distress will come to an end, as both 
investment spending and output rise. Such a decision can have a positive effect on the stock 
market. 
It is also important not to lose sight of the fact that such monetary policy decisions will be made 
by countries whose primary concern is to regulate inflation. Granville and Mallick (2006) suggest 
that only mature economies are trying to regulate inflation using interest rates. Other economies, 
mainly emerging, are trying to regulate their exchange rate fluctuations, instead. 
Despite the fact that these are the theoretical transmission mechanisms through which oil price 
shocks propagate the economy and the stock market, it is important to consider the findings of 
the empirical research in this area, as well. In this regard, this will be the focal point of Section 3. 
 
3. Background of the Study 
3.1. Oil price effect on the economy 
Mounting empirical evidence indicates that oil prices exercise a strong influence on the economy. 
Various authors in the past have examined the effects of oil prices on industrial production and 
inflation, suggesting a negative effect on industrial production and a positive effect on inflation 
(see, inter alia, Tang, Wu and Zhang, 2010; Du, He and Wei, 2010; Miller and Ratti, 2009; 
Cologni and Manera, 2008; Ciner 2001; Haung et al, 1996; Ferderer, 1996; Gisser and Goodwin, 
1986; Burbridge and Harrison, 1984; Hamilton, 1983). An increased oil price would inflate 
production costs, subsequently resulting in lower production and lower expected earnings (Jones, 
Lelby and Paik, 2004).  
Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2005) find that there is a bidirectional relationship between oil 
price movements and macroeconomic indicators, such as inflation. They also point out the 
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different effect that oil prices exercise on oil-importing and oil-exporting economies. On one 
hand, an oil price increase could be beneficiary for the oil-exporting country whereas, on the 
other hand, it could be detrimental for the oil-importing country. Similar findings were presented 
by Mendoza and Vera (2010), Korhonen and Ledyaeva (2010), Bjornland (2009) and Lescaroux 
and Mignon (2008). Cunado and Perez de Gracia (2005) suggest that the effect of oil prices on 
macroeconomic indicators tends to be different when oil prices are converted to domestic 
currency rather than US dollar terms. Barsky and Kilian (2004), on the other hand, argue that an 
oil price shock does not necessarily lead to an immediate effect on the economy. 
Other studies have shown, though, a structural break in the relationship between oil prices and 
macroeconomic indicators after the 1980s. More specifically, they support the view that oil price 
changes do not significantly affect inflation and thus they are not the main source for economic 
downturn, as Hamilton had suggested back in 1983. This structural break can be partly attributed 
to the recent trend in national monetary policy formulation being focused on the confrontation of 
inflationary pressures (Lescaroux and Mignon, 2008; Blanchard and Gali, 2007; Bernanke et al, 
1997). The International Energy Agency (2006) reports that when a country is in a state of 
economic growth, it is not likely to face the negative impacts of an oil price increase, with respect 
to inflation. This is mainly due to the fact that both increased productivity and investments enable 
firms to absorb production input costs.  
Through the lens of monetary policy response to oil price shocks, central banks are faced with a 
trade-off between inflation and output (Castillo, Montoro and Tuesta, 2010). Bernanke et al 
(1997) argue that a contractionary monetary policy is not necessarily the optimal solution, since it 
could aggravate the negative effects of these shocks. In particular, they advocate that the negative 
effects of oil price shocks that the US economy experienced during the period of late 70s to early 
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90s, should be mainly attributed to the monetary policy response of the Federal Reserve Bank, 
rather than to the oil price shock itself. Had the FED assumed a neutral policy (i.e. no alteration 
of the funds rate) the output contraction would have been substantially less. This analysis is in 
line with an earlier study by Bohi (1989). However, Hamilton and Herrera (2004) support the 
view that the relative contribution of monetary policy and oil price shocks to economic 
developments may not be as effective as Bernanke et al (1997) have suggested. In addition, 
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), as well as, DeLong (1997) propose that different monetary 
policy rules could result in substantially different inflation responses to oil price shocks.  
At the other end of the spectrum, considering that oil price shocks could be regarded as purely 
monetary shocks in nature, active monetary policy is then required not only to subdue 
inflationary pressures but also to ensure minimum contractionary effects on output (Castillo et al, 
2010; Romer and Romer, 1989).            
Jimenez-Rodriguez (2009) provides another angle on the relationship between oil prices and the 
economy. She argues that the effects of oil price shocks should be considered along with the 
economic environment at the time of the shock. Oil price shocks during stable economic periods 
would generate a higher impact on the economy compared to similar shocks during turbulent 
periods. 
 
3.2. Oil price effect on the stock market 
Oil prices are expected to have both a direct and an indirect negative influence on stock market 
performance. The direct effect can be explained by the fact that oil price shocks can be 
considered as a risk factor for financial markets and thus a positive oil price shock may induce a 
decrease in share prices (Jones and Kaul, 1996). On the other hand, an indirect negative effect 
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can also be justified. Evidence from the previous section (section 3.1) supports the view that 
higher oil prices lead to higher inflation, which, in turn cause a negative effect on the stock 
market.  
This negative relationship between oil prices and stock returns has also been documented by Filis 
(2010), Chen (2009), Miller and Ratti (2009), Driesprong, Jacobsen and Maat (2008), Nandha 
and Faff (2008), O'Neill, Penm and Terrell (2008), Park and Ratti (2008), Bachmeier (2008), 
Ciner (2001) and Gjerde and Sættem (1999). Nandha and Brooks (2009) maintain that the effect 
of oil prices on stock market returns depends not only on the country’s characteristics but also on 
the industry sector. Sadorsky (1999), also reaches the same conclusion and further documents 
that oil price volatility has an impact on stock returns, as well. Similar findings are reported by 
Malik and Ewing (2009), who also observe that the oil price volatility causes negative effects on 
stock market returns. Oberndorfer (2009) seconds that opinion in his study of the effect of oil 
price volatility on European stock markets.  
A slightly different approach is adopted by Haung et al (1996) who examine the relationship 
between oil future price returns and US stock returns. In agreement with Chen, Roll and Ross 
(1986), they provide evidence that oil future prices tend to influence oil companies’ stock returns 
but not the overall market. 
All aforementioned studies mainly concern oil-importing countries. Pertaining to oil-exporting 
countries, Arouri and Rault (2009) subscribe to the belief that a positive oil price shock has a 
positive impact on the stock market performance. Similar results are documented by Bashar 
(2006). However, Al-Fayoumi (2009) finds no evidence regarding the aforementioned 
relationship. 
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Several studies focus on the origin of the oil price shock in order to understand and interpret the 
effects of oil price shocks on stock markets (see, inter alia, Hamilton, 2009a,b; Kilian, 2009; 
Lescaroux and Mignon, 2008; Barsky and Kilian, 2004; Terzian, 1985). Hamilton (2009a), for 
example, draws a distinction line between the sources of an oil price shock. According to him, an 
oil price shock could either originate from the industrialisation of countries such as China 
(demand-side shock) or from the lack of an immediate response of oil-supply to a large scale 
increase in oil-demand (supply-side shock). Kilian (2009), on the other hand, argues that there 
are three sources of oil price shocks, namely, aggregate demand-side shock, precautionary 
demand-side shock and supply-side shock. Aggregate demand-side shocks occur due to global 
business cycle’s fluctuations, precautionary demand shocks occur due to the uncertainty of future 
oil supply based on the expectations of future oil demand, while supply-side shocks are 
exogenous shocks and occur due to reduction of crude oil availability. Kilian and Park (2009) 
maintain that demand-side oil price shocks influence stock prices more than the supply-side 
shocks.  
In particular, Kilian and Park (2007) show that demand driven shocks cause negative effects on 
US stock market returns. However, oil price increases, due to global economic expansion, tend to 
have a significant positive effect on stock returns. In the same line of reasoning, Hamilton 
(2009a) argues that demand-side shocks deriving from the industrialisation of countries such as 
China could have a significant positive impact on the stock markets. 
A quite different approach on the investigation of oil price effect on stock markets is followed by 
Filis, Degiannakis and Floros (2011) and Bharn and Nikolova (2010). These studies use measures 
of dynamic correlation between stock market and oil prices and provide evidence of an 
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asymmetric behaviour of the correlation between the two asset returns, which depends on the 
source of the oil price shock (i.e. demand-side shock or supply-side shock). 
Contrary to the above, part of the literature finds that there is no relationship between oil price 
innovations and stock markets (see, inter alia, Jammazi and Aloui, 2010; Apergis and Miller, 
2009; Cong, Wei, Jiao and Fan, 2008).  
It should also be noted that the majority of these studies do not include both oil-importing and 
oil-exporting countries in their sample. Thus the current research bridges this gap by including 
both oil-importing and oil-exporting countries in the sample.  
4. Methodology and Data Description 
4.1. Methodology 
We examine the dynamic relationship among the growth rates of oil prices (OIL), the consumer 
price index (INF), interest rates (INT) and stock market index (IND), in two net oil-exporting 
countries (Norway and Russia) and seven net oil-importing countries (UK, Germany, France, 
Italy, Spain, Netherlands and Portugal), by employing a Structural VAR model, separately for 
each country. We also investigate the transmission mechanism of the stochastic shocks of these 
series. 
The structural representation of the VAR model of order p takes the following general form: 
  
(1) 
 
where ty  is a m × 1 vector of endogenous variables,  are m × m autoregressive coefficient 
matrices, εt is an  m × 1 vector of structural disturbances, assumed to have zero covariance and be 
serially uncorrelated.  is a m × m matrix containing the contemporaneous relations among the 
variables. In order to get the reduce form of model (1) we multiply both sides of the equation 
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with . Let et be the reduced form errors, where  , assumed to be white noise 
processes. The structural disturbances can be derived by imposing suitable restrictions on . 
With reference to the AD/AS and the ISLM frameworks analysed in section 2, the ordering of the 
variables and the exclusion restrictions in our model, are as follows: 
 
 
In short we assume that the oil price shock is considered to be our exogenous shock that triggers 
inflationary pressures in the economy. Monetary policy authority will, in turn, respond to these 
pressures by altering interest rates. All aforementioned variables are expected to affect stock 
market developments. 
To proceed to the estimation of the reduced form of model (1), it is first necessary to establish the 
stationarity of the variables. The ADF and PP unit root tests with intercept only and trend and 
intercept suggest that all variables are I(0)2. The order of each model was identified using the 
Akaike Information Criterion3. For almost all countries (UK, Germany, France, Netherlands and 
Russia) the AIC proposes a VAR model of order 6. For the rest of the countries (Italy, Spain, 
Portugal and Norway) the lag-length that was suggested by AIC was 5. In this regard, we have 
decided to use six lags for all countries. 
4.2. Data Description 
We use monthly data from 1991:01 to 2010:04 for UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
                                                 
2 Results can be obtained upon request. 
3 Results can be obtained upon request. 
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Netherlands and Norway. For Russia the data used are from 1996:04 to 2010:044 and for Portugal 
from 1995:02 to 2010:045. The stock market indices used are the FTSE100 (UK), DAX30 
(Germany), SBF120 (France), MIBTel (Italy), IBEX35 (Spain), AEX (Netherlands), PS120 
(Portugal), OBX25 (Norway) and RTS (Russia). We also take each country’s CPI, which is 
seasonally adjusted with the same base year (2000). The interest rates used in this study are the 1-
month interbank rates of each country. For oil we use the Brent crude oil prices, converted in 
local currency. Brent crude oil was chosen, as a proxy of world oil price, due to the fact that this 
type of oil represents the 60% of the world oil daily consumption (Maghyereh, 2004). We 
convert oil prices into real oil prices by taking into consideration the exchange rate between the 
currency6 of each country and the US dollar over the period of study, as well as, the consumer 
price indices. Interest rates and stock market prices are expressed in real terms, as well, taking 
into consideration the corresponding CPI index. 
The stock market prices and interest rates were collected from Datastream®, consumer price 
indices were collected from the Eurostat and the national statistical services of the selected 
countries and oil prices in dollar terms were extracted from Energy Information Administration. 
All variables are expressed in logarithms. 
5. Empirical Results and Discussion 
5.1. Preliminary Tests  
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the series. It can be observed that OIL is showing the 
lower amplitude on all countries, whereas INT exhibits the higher amplitude. An exception is 
Russia, whose stock market (IND) exhibit greater volatility than all other series. In addition, the 
                                                 
4 We do not consider any available data prior to 1996, as during this time Russia was in a transition period, which 
was characterised by a volatile behaviour of the variables under consideration. This is in line with Granville and 
Mallick (2010). 
5 Data availability issues have imposed constraints to our sample period. 
6 Exchange rates were collected from Pacific Exchange Rate Service. 
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Russian stock market is having the higher volatility compared to all stock markets. This is mainly 
due to the fact that Russia has a newly established stock market. CPI exhibits low amplitude on 
all countries, expect for Russia. Furthermore, we can observe that the INT is negative in some 
countries, which shows the declining nature of interest rates during the period under 
consideration in this study.  
 
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
All variables have a mean very close to zero. However, there is an indication of non-normally 
distributed series, as J-B statistic is significant in all cases. This is probably due to non-linearities 
involved in the growth rate fluctuations. This non-normality is also evident from the kurtosis and 
skewness coefficients.  
 
5.2. Structural VAR results – Impulse Response Functions 
The purpose of the VAR-family models (including the SVAR framework) is mainly to examine 
the dynamic adjustments of each of the involved variables to exogenous stochastic structural 
shocks (see, inter alia, Bjornland and Leitemo, 2009; Kilian and Park, 2009; Papapetrou, 2001; 
Burbridge and Harrison, 1984). Thus, as space is limited, we only present the analysis of the 
impulse response functions7. 
 
[FIGURE 3] 
[TABLE 2] 
                                                 
7 The actual VAR(6) coefficient tables are available upon request. 
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Starting from the net oil-importing countries of our sample; a positive oil price shock in Germany 
results in an immediate positive response of inflation. This effect decreases over time, until it 
becomes negligible 10 months later. However, since the forth month after the initial oil price 
shock, the response of inflation is at a minimum. Interest rates react immediately and positively 
to the oil price increase. On the other hand, interest rates react positively to inflationary pressures 
with one month delay. The stock market initially has a negative response to the oil price shock, 
oscillating negatively for a period of 8 months before starting to fade out. In addition, inflation 
and interest rates seem to exercise a negative impact on the stock market, as these are depicted by 
the impulse response functions. Kaul and Seyhun (1990) proponent that the effect of inflation on 
stock market performance could be triggered by output shocks caused by disturbances in crude 
oil prices. Past studies have also documented these relationships (see, inter alia, Miller and Ratti, 
2009; Nandha and Faff, 2008; Park and Ratti, 2008 for the effect of oil prices on the stock 
market; Cologni and Manera, 2008; Omrana, 2003; Flannery and Protopapadakis, 2002 for the 
effect of inflation on the stock market). With respect to the effect of interest rates on the stock 
market, a similar finding is reported in the empirical work of Laopodis (2010) and Bjornland and 
Leitemo (2009).  
Overall, the patterns that hold for Germany can also be observed in all remaining net oil-
importing countries, namely UK, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands and Portugal. Our results are 
in line with economic theory, in the sense that such developments are expected in countries that 
employ an inflation targeting monetary policy rule.  
However, particularly for UK and Portugal, we notice that the positive response of inflation to 
the oil price shock exhibits an increasing pace for two months, before it eventually starts 
decreasing. Hence, we observe that the oil price shock is more persistent in the UK and Portugal, 
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as opposed to all remaining net oil-importers. This finding suggests that Germany, France, Italy, 
Spain and Netherlands exhibit their capacity to battle inflationary pressures (due to oil price 
increases) immediately, whereas delays are observed in the UK and Portugal. With reference to 
Portugal, a plausible explanation of this persistence could be the small size of its economy, 
reflecting, to a certain extent, its limited ability to absorb oil price shocks immediately. By 
contrast, the inflation persistence in the UK can be explained, in part, due to the country’s trade 
dependence on oil. In particular, even though UK is currently a net oil-importer, it is at the same 
time a major oil producer. Thus, a positive oil price shock will have multiple effects. On one 
hand, the economy will experience cost-push inflation, reflecting the country’s oil importer 
character; while, on the other hand, demand-side inflationary pressures could also arise, 
reflecting the country’s oil producer status.  
The UK stock market response to a positive oil price shock is typical for a net oil-importing 
country, even though the country is also regarded as a major oil producer. Nevertheless, this 
response is expected, as an increase in oil prices could cause a significant appreciation of the UK 
currency, as shown by Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2005). The currency appreciation could 
lead to output reduction, via the decrease of the country’s competitiveness and thus the stock 
market will respond negatively to such an event.  
A final comment on net oil-importers concerns the fact that the Dutch stock market does not 
respond to oil and interest rate innovations. 
Turning to the net oil-exporting countries; a positive oil price shock in Russia causes a positive 
response of inflation; a response which is immediate and of high magnitude, indicating demand-
side inflation (see, inter alia, Bjornland, 2009; LeBlanc and Chinn, 2004; Hooker 2002). The 
effect of oil price increases on inflation disappears rapidly (one to two months later) and 
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eventually becomes negligible eight months after the shock. Furthermore, an immediate and 
negative response of interest rates to a positive oil price shock can be reported. Interest rates 
respond negatively and immediately on inflationary pressures, as well. Admittedly, these results 
lack theoretical flavour in the sense that they are not supported by any prevailing economic 
argument. Nonetheless, a plausible explanation of these responses could be found in the 
monetary policy targeting that Russia is engaged with. In particular, Russia’s monetary policy is 
not inflation targeting; instead, it has an exchange rate targeting regime (for further details on the 
Russian monetary policy regime the reader is directed to the paper by Granville and Mallick 
(2010), as well as, to the guidelines for the single state monetary policy prepared by the central 
bank of Russia for the year 2010). Increased oil prices will trigger an appreciation of the Russian 
ruble. Considering that the appreciation of the currency will breach the upper boundary set by the 
Russian monetary authority and taking into account the interest rate parity, we anticipate an 
immediate reduction on the country’s interest rates in response to the oil price increase. To 
further our analysis regarding Russia, its stock market initially responds negatively to the positive 
oil price shock; this response, however, becomes positive from the second month onwards and 
eventually dies out completely in about two years time. In addition, stock market responds 
negatively to both inflation and interest rates shocks. Similar conclusions were presented in other 
studies, such as Omrana (2003), Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002) and Siklos and Kwok 
(1999). 
As far as Norway is concerned, a positive oil price shock causes a positive response from 
inflation which is rather low in magnitude and eventually becomes negligible three months later. 
Furthermore, we cannot identify any significant effect of oil on interest rates; at least not until 
four months have passed. Interest rates though, respond immediately and positively to 
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inflationary pressures and a peak is reached by the seventh month. The magnitude of this 
response, however, is rather low. Finally, on one hand, we have a positive impact of the oil price 
shock on the stock market (similarly with Bjornland, 2009; Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez, 
2005), whereas, on the other hand, the stock market reacts negatively to inflationary pressures 
and interest rates developments. 
Overall, we find evidence suggesting that oil prices affect the level of inflation in both net oil-
exporting and net oil-importing countries, which is in disagreement with what Hamilton (2008), 
Lescaroux and Mignon (2008) and Blanchard and Gali (2007) have said, i.e. that from 1980s 
onwards inflationary pressures cannot be attributed to oil price increases, since the importance of 
oil, as a production input, gradually decreases.  
Furthermore, we find that the response of interest rates to an oil price shock depends heavily on 
the monetary policy regime of each country. We observe that countries which adopt an inflation 
targeting regime, exhibit an inclination towards restricting inflationary pressures (triggered by oil 
price increases) by immediately increasing interest rates. 
On general principles, stock markets in net oil-importing countries exhibit a negative response to 
increased oil prices. On the contrary, the response is positive for net oil-exporters, as expected.  
Finally, our results distinguish between responses of traditional and newly established and/or thin 
stock markets in oil price shocks. In particular, it is evident that the magnitude of stock market 
responses to oil price shocks is higher for the newly established and/or thin stock markets (such 
as Russia and Norway). This finding can be attributed to the fact that thin stock markets tend to 
overestimate the workings of economic activity. 
A summary of the findings can be found in table 3.  
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
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6. Conclusion 
In this study, we investigate the financial and monetary policy responses to oil price changes in 
nine countries, namely UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Portugal, Norway and 
Russia; corresponding to two net oil-exporting countries (Norway and Russia) and seven net oil-
importing countries (UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands and Portugal).  
Overall, we find evidence show that the level of inflation in both net oil-exporting and net oil-
importing countries is positively affected by oil prices. A finding which poses a contradiction to 
what Hamilton (2008), Lescaroux and Mignon (2008) and Blanchard and Gali (2007) have 
argued, i.e. that from 1980s onwards inflationary pressures cannot be attributed to oil price 
increases. Furthermore, we find that the response of interest rates to an oil price shock depends 
heavily on the monetary policy regime of each country. In addition, the stock markets of net oil-
importers exhibit a negative response to increased oil prices. However, the reverse is true for net 
oil-exporting countries, a finding which is in line with Bjornland (2009) and Arouri and Rault 
(2009).  
Finally, our results distinguish between responses of traditional and newly established and/or thin 
stock markets to oil price shocks. In particular, it is evident that the magnitude of stock market 
responses to oil price shocks is higher for the newly established and/or less liquid stock markets 
(such as Russia and Norway). This can be attributed to the fact that these stock markets tend to 
overestimate the workings of real economic activity. 
Further research in the field should incorporate the origin of oil price shocks; that is whether it 
comes from the supply-side or the demand-side. Finally, further study could examine the 
asymmetric effects of oil prices on monetary policy and stock market responses. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for oil prices, inflation, interest rates and stock market 
    Series   Mean   St. Dev.   Skewness   Kurtosis   J-B Stat. 
UK  
 
OIL 
 
 0.002 
 
 0.004 
 
 1.209 
 
 12.721 
 
 948.959* 
  
INF 
 
 0.004 
 
 0.043 
 
-0.731 
 
 5.523 
 
 80.417* 
  
INT 
 
 0.006 
 
 0.106 
 
-0.045 
 
 3.938 
 
 8.413* 
  
IND 
 
-0.014 
 
0.059 
 
-2.915 
 
16.84 
 
2170.882* 
             Germany  
 
OIL 
 
 0.001 
 
 0.002 
 
 0.252 
 
 15.254 
 
 1422.681* 
  
INF 
 
 0.005 
 
 0.065 
 
-1.064 
 
 7.454 
 
 230.191* 
  
INT 
 
 0.006 
 
 0.104 
 
-0.173 
 
 4.194 
 
 14.636* 
  
IND 
 
-0.012 
 
0.064 
 
-1.711 
 
9.904 
 
571.665* 
             France  
 
OIL 
 
 0.001 
 
 0.001 
 
 0.446 
 
 4.314 
 
 23.867* 
  
INF 
 
 0.004 
 
 0.059 
 
-0.765 
 
 5.591 
 
 85.623* 
  
INT 
 
 0.007 
 
 0.104 
 
-0.195 
 
 4.201 
 
 15.101* 
  
IND 
 
-0.011 
 
0.084 
 
0.643 
 
13.468 
 
1070.758* 
             Italy 
 
OIL 
 
 0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.489 
 
8.671 
 
320.128* 
  
INF 
 
0.002 
 
0.001 
 
-0.238 
 
4.001 
 
8.751* 
  
INT 
 
-0.021 
 
0.084 
 
-2.051 
 
10.593 
 
530.704* 
  
IND 
 
0.005 
 
0.063 
 
-0.626 
 
4.218 
 
21.751* 
             Spain 
 
OIL 
 
 0.001 
 
0.002 
 
0.326 
 
4.389 
 
22.759* 
  
INF 
 
0.002 
 
0.002 
 
-0.293 
 
3.861 
 
7.722* 
  
INT 
 
-0.021 
 
0.082 
 
-2.059 
 
10.943 
 
570.301* 
  
IND 
 
0.004 
 
0.063 
 
-0.617 
 
4.155 
 
20.339* 
             Netherlands 
 
OIL 
 
 0.002 
 
0.002 
 
0.267 
 
8.923 
 
341.881* 
  
INF 
 
0.002 
 
0.002 
 
-0.100 
 
6.625 
 
93.937* 
  
INT 
 
-0.014 
 
0.081 
 
-1.922 
 
9.580 
 
413.709* 
  
IND 
 
0.001 
 
0.068 
 
-1.650 
 
8.590 
 
300.234* 
             Portugal  
 
OIL 
 
 0.002 
 
 0.003 
 
 0.434 
 
 3.712 
 
 9.883* 
  
INF 
 
 0.007 
 
 0.056 
 
-0.202 
 
 3.734 
 
 5.569* 
  
INT 
 
 0.008 
 
 0.101 
 
-0.359 
 
 4.103 
 
 13.742* 
  
IND 
 
-0.016 
 
0.071 
 
-1.547 
 
9.091 
 
356.009* 
             Norway  
 
OIL 
 
 0.001 
 
 0.004 
 
 0.637 
 
 7.037 
 
 114.292* 
  
INF 
 
 0.011 
 
 0.061 
 
-0.867 
 
 3.969 
 
 25.186* 
  
INT 
 
 0.010 
 
 0.102 
 
-0.382 
 
 3.896 
 
 8.857* 
  
IND 
 
-0.007 
 
0.086 
 
-0.461 
 
8.441 
 
293.237* 
 28 
             Russia  
 
OIL 
 
-0.001 
 
 0.033 
 
 0.375 
 
 66.294 
 
 2242.971* 
  
INF 
 
 0.021 
 
 0.139 
 
-0.807 
 
 5.635 
 
 60.741* 
  
INT 
 
 0.024 
 
 0.127 
 
 1.183 
 
 9.717 
 
 323.433* 
    IND   -0.012   0.207   1.126   5.219   71.265* 
* significant at 5% level. 
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Table 2: Structural VAR model: Impulse Response Functions (time required for the shock to be absorbed) 
  
 
  
 
UK  
 
Germany 
 
France  
 
Italy 
 
Spain 
 
Netherlands 
 
Portugal  
 
Norway 
 
Russia 
Response of OIL to shocks from 
 
OIL 
 
24 
 
22 
 
26 
 
15 
 
13 
 
31 
 
36 
 
25 
 
23 
  
INF 
 
26 
 
25 
 
30 
 
13 
 
10 
 
30 
 
34 
 
26 
 
22 
  
INT 
 
25 
 
23 
 
27 
 
11 
 
12 
 
26 
 
32 
 
22 
 
20 
  
IND 
 
16 
 
27 
 
26 
 
12 
 
14 
 
28 
 
41 
 
26 
 
19 
                     Response of INF to shocks from 
 
OIL 
 
22 
 
25 
 
25 
 
21 
 
19 
 
28 
 
41 
 
30 
 
25 
  
INF 
 
32 
 
29 
 
30 
 
20 
 
17 
 
29 
 
47 
 
31 
 
26 
  
INT 
 
28 
 
31 
 
26 
 
18 
 
18 
 
27 
 
38 
 
27 
 
21 
  
IND 
 
27 
 
30 
 
21 
 
19 
 
18 
 
31 
 
40 
 
32 
 
26 
                     Response of INT to shocks from 
 
OIL 
 
23 
 
19 
 
27 
 
24 
 
21 
 
33 
 
35 
 
30 
 
25 
  
INF 
 
20 
 
25 
 
34 
 
23 
 
19 
 
34 
 
32 
 
32 
 
26 
  
INT 
 
24 
 
22 
 
22 
 
20 
 
21 
 
32 
 
33 
 
29 
 
24 
  
IND 
 
26 
 
24 
 
18 
 
21 
 
20 
 
35 
 
38 
 
31 
 
26 
                     Response of IND to shocks from 
 
OIL 
 
18 
 
22 
 
27 
 
18 
 
19 
 
27 
 
37 
 
25 
 
20 
  
INF 
 
21 
 
16 
 
32 
 
19 
 
17 
 
28 
 
31 
 
23 
 
22 
  
INT 
 
16 
 
19 
 
31 
 
16 
 
18 
 
26 
 
34 
 
26 
 
21 
    IND   18   24   24   17   18   29   30   26   22 
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Table 3: Summary of the SVAR findings 
Country   
Responses to positive  
OIL shocks   
Responses to positive 
 CPI shocks   
Responses to positive  
INT shocks   
Responses to positive  
IND shocks 
  CPI INT IND   OIL INT IND   OIL CPI IND   OIL CPI INT 
Net oil-importers:                                 
UK   + D + D     -   - D    +     -   0 0     -   0    + + D 
Germany      + + D     -   - D + D     -   0 0 - D   0 + D + D 
France      + + D     -   0    +     -   0 0 - D   0 + D + D 
Italy      +    + - D   0    +     -   0 0     -   0 0 + D 
Spain      +    + - D   0    + - D   0 + D - D   0 + D + D 
Netherlands      + + D 0   0    + - D   0 - D 0   0 0 + D 
Portugal   + D + D     -   0    +     -   0 0 - D   0     + + D 
Net oil-exporters:                                 
Russia      +    - + D   0    -     -   + D + D     -   + D     -     - 
Norway      + 0     +      -    +     -   0 0     -   + D 0 + D 
Note: + denotes a positive response, - denotes negative response, 0 denotes no response                    
           D denotes a delayed response                             
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Oil price effect on a net oil-exporting country 
 
 
Figure 2: Oil price effect on a net oil-importing country 
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Figure 3: Structural VAR model: Impulse Response Functions                                                    
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Portugal 
 
 
Norway 
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Russia 
 
 
 
 
